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I. INTRODUCTION
“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.” 1
However, the law is multiple experiences, not one. Litigation brings
these various experiences together. While plaintiffs, defendants, and
their attorneys each have different backgrounds and different interests
that affect the course of litigation, the adjudicators within a case—the
trial judge, the jury, and appellate judges—have an equally important
impact on a case’s outcome. The right to a jury trial preserved by the
Seventh Amendment helps determine the extent to which the
adjudicators impact the outcome of a particular case.
Implicit within the right to a jury trial are considerations regarding
which adjudicator properly decides each issue, a determination which
takes into account the various experiences of each adjudicator. Trial
judges have general legal experience as they regularly interpret the
written law and construe legal documents. 2 Full dockets also provide
trial judges with administrative experience. 3 In contrast to trial judges,
juries generally lack familiarity with the law. Jurors compensate for
their lack of legal know-how with practical experience. Collectively, the
jury contributes its real world experience, which each individual juror
gained through his or her unique life experiences, various occupations,
and differing educational backgrounds. 4 In the background of any
discussion on trial level adjudicators lurks the threat of appeal to
appellate courts with appellate judges. Appellate judges are ideally
selected for their legal expertise and experience. 5 While trial judges
have legal experience, appellate judges generally have a broader and
deeper perspective, since they are exposed to a wide range of cases and
have “a greater opportunity to research, analyze, discuss, and debate

1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE C OMMON L AW 1 (1881).
2. See Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review – Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ . L. R EV .
231, 239 (1991); Nichole Biglin, Enablement: For the Judge or the Jury? Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.’s Analysis Applied, 52 D RAKE L. R EV . 145, 156 (2003).
3. Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. P RAC.& P ROCESS 101,
105 (2005).
4. Julia Reytblat, Is Originality in Copyright Law a “Question of Law” or a “Question of
Fact?”: the Fact Solution, 17 C ARDOZO ARTS & ENT . L.J. 181, 196 (1999).
5. Warner, supra note 3, at 105.
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important legal issues.” 6
As with all litigation, adjudicators’
experiences interact in public employee free speech suits.
The Supreme Court has held that whether a public employee’s speech
is constitutionally protected is a question of law for the judge to
determine. 7 However, the Court’s holding in Garcetti v. Ceballos 8
altered the analysis used when determining if a public employee’s
speech is constitutionally protected. By altering the test, the Court
opened the door to questioning the traditional holding that the protected
status of speech is a question of law. Through this open door, multiple
circuits have weighed in, creating a circuit split as to whether that
determination is to be made by the judge or the jury. This Comment
argues that in order to protect the substance of the jury trial right and in
light of the Court’s recent changes to the public employee free speech
analysis, the inquiry into the protected status of public employee speech
must be a mixed question of law and fact.
Part II of this Comment addresses the right to a jury trial preserved by
the Seventh Amendment in conjunction with 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Part II
also addresses the proper allocation of responsibility to the judge and the
jury. Part III explores the Supreme Court’s test for analyzing public
employee free speech. Part IV uses the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille School District No. 84 9 to address the circuit
split. Part V synthesizes the previous portions of the Comment to argue
that the protected status of speech must be labeled a mixed question of
law and fact in order to protect the substance of the right to a jury trial.
Finally, Part VI concludes that the uncertainty introduced by the
Supreme Court’s Garcetti decision should be resolved by adopting the
Ninth Circuit’s approach in Posey.
II. THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND 42
U.S.C. § 1983
Lord Coke’s axiom that “[j]udges decide questions of law; juries
decide questions of fact” provides the origins of the question of law/fact
dichotomy. 10 The rule has been generally accepted since the mid-

6. Id.
7. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983).
8. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
9. 546 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2008).
10. The quotation is a translation of Lord Coke’s rule “‘ad questioniam facti non respondent
judices, . . . ad questioniam juries non respondent juratores.’” J. Wilson Parker, Free Expression and the
Function of the Jury, 65 B.U. L. R EV . 483, 485 n.7 (1985) (quoting 1 E. C OKE , C OMMENTARY OF
LITTLETON *155.b).
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sixteenth century and is recognized by the Supreme Court. 11 However,
the rule only applies when there is a jury trial. 12 In the United States,
the Seventh Amendment serves as the basis for the right to a jury trial.
The Seventh Amendment states, “[i]n [s]uits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved . . . according to the rules of the common law.” 13 The
vagueness of this language preserves an undefined right to trial by jury,
which poses two key questions: what causes of action trigger the jury
right and what questions must be decided by the jury once the right is
triggered? 14 Each of these questions will be addressed below.
A. Triggering the Right to Trial by Jury
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incorporate the Seventh
Amendment’s preservation of the right to a jury trial. 15 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 38(b) permits any party to demand their right to
trial by jury as preserved by the Seventh Amendment or as provided for
by a federal statute. 16 A public employee attempting to vindicate
infringements on their right to freedom of speech asserts their claim
through federal statute. 17 Therefore, the right to a jury trial must be
analyzed under both the Seventh Amendment and as guaranteed by the
requisite federal statute.
1. Trial by Jury Under the Seventh Amendment
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in suits at
common law. 18 This language refers to suits for legal rights but not for
equitable rights. 19 At the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted
suits for legal and equitable rights were adjudicated in separate forums;
however, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created a unified system
11. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (“The controlling distinction between the power
of the court and that of the jury is that the former is the power to determine the law and the latter to
determine the facts.”).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1). “In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.” Id.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
14. Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh
Amendment, 64 O HIO S T . L.J. 1125, 1126 (2003).
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 38.
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a), (b).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove & Robeson, 28 U.S. 433, 447
(1830).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Parsons, 28 U.S. at 447.
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under which legal and equitable rights can both be adjudicated in the
same forum. 20 Despite this merger, the Supreme Court “has carefully
preserved the right to trial by jury where legal rights are at stake.” 21 The
Supreme Court has held that whether a particular suit resolves legal
rights depends on a two-step analysis: “First, we compare the statutory
action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to
the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the
remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in
nature.” 22 When engaging in this two-step analysis, the Court has stated
that “[t]he second inquiry is . . . more important.” 23 One justice has
suggested dispensing with the first inquiry altogether and basing the
right to a jury trial solely on the remedy sought. 24
In Teamsters Local 391 v. Terry, 25 the Supreme Court applied this
two-step process to determine whether a group of truck drivers were
entitled to a jury trial in their suit against the local union for breaching
their duty of fair representation. 26 The truck drivers were union
members, 27 who received seniority status within the company as
compensation for transferring to other cities. 28 After they moved, the
truck drivers lost their bargained-for seniority status due to multiple layoffs. 29 Following receipt of the truck drivers’ grievance, the union’s
grievance committee determined the employer violated the truck drivers’
rights and ordered the company to recognize the drivers’ seniority
status. 30 Despite this ruling, the company continued to function in a
way that deprived the drivers of their seniority status. 31 As a result, two
more grievances were filed with the union. 32 The union refused to take

20. “There is one form of action—the civil action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 2. See R ICHARD L.
MARCUS, M ARTIN H. R EDISH & EDWARD F. S HERMAN , C IVIL P ROCEDURE : A M ODERN
APPROACH 529–31 (4th ed. 2008).
21. Teamsters Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990).
22. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987) (citations omitted).
23. Teamsters, 494 U.S. at 565.
24. Id. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Although Justice
Brennan agreed that the truck drivers were entitled to a jury trial, he indicated that the Court continues to
diminish “the significance of the analogous form of action for deciding where the Seventh Amendment
applies. I think it is time we dispense with it altogether.” Id.
25. 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
26. Id. at 562–63, 565.
27. Id. at 561.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 562.
32. Id.
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action on the third grievance. 33
After being denied relief within the union, the truck drivers filed suit
against the union for “violat[ing] its duty of fair representation.” 34 The
truck drivers sued for “compensatory damages[,] for lost wages and
health benefits” and requested a jury trial. 35 The request was granted by
the district court and affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. 36 The union
appealed. 37
The Supreme Court affirmed the truck drivers’ right to a jury trial. 38
Under the first step of the analysis, the Court attempted to find a
common law analogy to a suit alleging breach of a union’s duty; they
held the issue was “comparable to a breach of contract claim—a legal
issue.” 39 The Court proceeded to the second step and determined that a
damages remedy was traditionally a legal remedy. 40 Since both
inquiries indicated the suit was a legal action, the Court held that the
truck drivers were entitled to a trial by jury. 41
2. Trial by Jury Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The right to a jury trial can be granted by federal statute. 42 When a
public employee sues his government employer, the appropriate federal
statute depends on the individual’s employer. If the public employee is
employed by a state or municipal government, the employee would
bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 43 A § 1983 suit requires two

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 563.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 566–70.
40. Id. at 570–71. While damages are generally viewed as a legal remedy, there are two
exceptions in which damages are equitable. Id. The first exception is when damages are restitutionary.
Id. The second is when the monetary damages are either incidental or intertwined with injunctive relief.
Id.
41. Id. at 573.
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”).
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elements. First, the plaintiff must have been deprived of a right secured
by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States. 44 Second, the
defendant must have acted under color of state law. 45 This second
requirement precludes § 1983 suits against federal officials, as these
officials do not act under state law. The language of § 1983 precludes
suit against a federal government employer. 46 This Part will focus on
the right to a jury trial under § 1983.
Although any party in an action can assert the right to a jury trial if
the right is provided for by a federal statute, 47 § 1983 “does not itself
confer the jury right.” 48 Therefore, the Supreme Court has analyzed the
right to a jury trial in a § 1983 suit under the Court’s traditional Seventh
Amendment two-part analysis. 49 Under the historical analysis prong,
the Court concluded the analysis is based on § 1983 as a statute instead
of the underlying constitutional right vindicated. 50 With this in mind,
the Court noted § 1983 did not have an equivalent at the time the
Seventh Amendment was adopted. 51
Despite the lack of an historical analogy, the Supreme Court has
traditionally held that the Seventh Amendment extends to statutory
claims unknown at common law when the suit is in essence a tort action
44. Id.; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Adickes, 398 U.S. at 150.
46. ERWIN C HEMERINSKY , F EDERAL J URISDICTION 605 (5th ed. 2007). The intricacy of a
public employee suing their federal employer is beyond the scope of this Comment. In brief, the
Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, that
the federal government could be sued for a constitutional violation without a statutory grant of authority.
403 U.S. 388, 392 (1977). The key proposition of Bivens was that “the judicial branch can enforce the
Constitution without congressional action.” See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing
Constitution, 68 S. C AL . L. R EV . 289, 291 (1995). See also J OHN C. J EFFRIES, J R., P AMELA S.
KARLAN , P ETER W. LOW & GEORGE A. R UTHERGLEN , C IVIL R IGHTS ACTIONS: E NFORCING THE
C ONSTITUTION 73 (2d ed. 2007) (“Although Bivens created the possibility that individuals whose
constitutional rights are violated by federal officers can receive compensation, success is rare”). The
Supreme Court limited Bivens’ application in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983). In Bush, the Court
concluded that the presence of an alternative remedial structure foreclosed bringing suit under Bivens.
Id. at 368. A NASA employee attempted to sue his employer for retaliating against his speech critical of
NASA. Id. at 369–71. The Court refused to apply Bivens since the claims were cognizable within a
congressional statutory scheme. Id. at 385–86. The Court indicated that federal civil servants were
“protected by an elaborate, comprehensive scheme that encompasse[d] substantive provisions forbidding
arbitrary action by supervisors and procedures—administrative and judicial—by which improper action
may be redressed;” the employee’s claim was fully cognizable within the scheme precluding Bivens’
application. Id. Ultimately, “federal employees with federal constitutional claims for damages will
nearly always have a remedy under the Civil Service Reform Act,” precluding their use of Bivens. See
JEFFRIES, supra, at 74.
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a)–(b).
48. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
49. Id. at 708.
50. Id. at 711.
51. Id. at 709.
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seeking legal relief. 52 Citing its precedent, the Court concluded that
claims brought under § 1983 sound in tort. 53 Based on this analysis, the
Court held if a § 1983 suit seeks legal relief it is an action at law under
the Seventh Amendment. 54 Therefore, the right to a jury trial in a
§ 1983 suit is based on the type of relief sought. 55
Once it has been determined that the right to a jury trial exists, the
court must determine which trial decisions “must fall to the jury in order
to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in
1791.” 56 This analysis is discussed in the following subsection.
B. Allocating Responsibility Between the Judge and Jury
Once the right to a jury trial is invoked, the decision-making authority
within the trial must be allocated between the judge and the jury.
Typically this allocation is done by classifying issues within the trial as
questions of law or of fact. When an issue is a mixed question of law
and fact, appellate courts can classify the specific issues as either a
question of law or of fact. 57 Classification is important since the label
affixed dictates who the decision-maker is at trial as well as the scope of
appellate review. 58
In dividing decision-making authority, the general notion is that
“juries decide questions of facts and judges decide questions of law.” 59
The reservation of the jury’s right to determine questions of fact is not
explicit. However, “the text of the [Seventh] Amendment and relevant
statutory provisions from the same time period strongly suggest that a
key feature of the jury right was the reservation of factual decisions for

52. Id. (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1974)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 710. This portion of the opinion is only for a plurality of justices as Justice Scalia did
not join the opinion regarding this matter.
55. Id. at 710–11.
56. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996).
57. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decisions Making Authority Between the Trial and
Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural
Discretion, 64 N.C. L. R EV . 993, 1017 (1986) (“[T]he lawmaking power of the appellate courts can be
subdivided into three subsidiary powers: (1) the law declaration power, which is the power to declare the
law and thus to impose on the trial level decision maker general rules affecting all cases that come
within the rules’ terms; (2) the supervisory power, which is the power to state as a matter of law,
generally through rulings on the sufficiency of the evidence, that a particular trial level finding of
historical or ultimate fact exceeds the limits of the discretion conferred; and (3) the classification power,
which is the power to withdraw particular mixed law/fact questions from the discretionary power of the
trial level by clarifying them as questions of law or as constitutional or jurisdictional facts.”).
58. Parker, supra note 10, at 485.
59. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 1131.
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the jury.” 60 The Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment
states “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined . . .
[except] according to the rules of the common law.” 61 While the clause
does not expressly allocate all issues of fact to the jury, “it suggests that
questions of fact were understood to be peculiarly the jury’s province.” 62
The Judiciary Act, 63 which was passed before the adoption of the
Seventh Amendment, provides further support for this contention. 64 The
Act states that “the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all
causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall
be by jury.” 65 Since the first Congress drafted the Judiciary Act and the
Seventh Amendment, it can be said that the text of “the Judiciary Act
provides a window into the procedural mindset of the first Congress,”
illuminating the meaning of the Seventh Amendment. 66
Classifying an issue as a question of law or fact also affects the
amount of deference an appellate court gives to a lower court’s
findings. 67 The Re-Examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment
prohibits a fact tried by the jury from being re-examined unless done so
in accordance with the common law. 68 Thus, appellate courts generally
review findings of fact with great deference, overriding “the decision
only if it is very, very wrong.” 69 In contrast, findings of law are
reviewed by appellate courts “de novo” or without deference. 70
With this as a background, the Supreme Court, in Markman v.
Westview Instruments Inc., 71 provided grounds for determining whether
an issue within a trial must be labeled a question of fact for the jury in

60. Id. at 1132.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
62. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 1132–33.
63. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
64. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 1133.
65. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
66. Kirgis, supra note 14, at 1133 (noting that the first Congress “would not have created a
constitutional right to a jury trial significantly different from the jury guarantee they had imposed on
federal trial courts by statute just two years earlier.”).
67. If the parties do not invoke the right to a jury trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38,
the litigation takes the form of a bench trial where the jury’s fact-finding authority passes to the trial
judge. The trial judge’s factual findings are entitled to the same amount of deference as if the findings
were made by a jury. See Warner, supra note 3, at 103–05 (“[F]indings of fact are reviewed with
deference regardless of whether they were made by a trial judge or a jury.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1)
(“In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts
specially and state its conclusions of law separately.”).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
69. Warner, supra note 3, at 104–05.
70. Id. at 105.
71. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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order to preserve the substance of the right to a jury trial. 72 In
Markman, the Court had to decide which judicial actor should determine
the construction of a patent. Markman brought suit against Westview
and Althon Enterprises for patent infringement, claiming their reporting
system, which tracked dry-cleaning charges on a bar code infringed on
the patent he had for a reporting system that used bar codes to “log the
progress of clothing through the dry-cleaning process.” 73 At trial, the
jury determined what was covered under Markman’s patent, and based
on their patent interpretation, they found an infringement. 74 However,
the district court interpreted the extent of the patent differently, found no
infringement, and granted Westview’s deferred motion for judgment as a
matter of law. 75
On appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
patent construction was an issue the jury was required to determine in
order to preserve the right to a jury trial. 76 Using a four-step analysis,
the Court determined that the trial judge was the proper party to construe
a patent. 77 The first step was to look at whether the specific issue was
historically left to a jury at common law, which could be a decisive
factor. 78 If history did not answer the question, the analysis proceeds to
consider precedent, functional considerations, and the importance of
uniformity within that area of law. 79
In Markman, the Supreme Court concluded that history and precedent
did not provide any guidance so the Court looked to functional
considerations. 80 The Court held that the judge was in a better position
to interpret the patent’s construction due to the judge’s experience, skill,
and training in construing written documents. 81 The Court also held that
uniformity was important in patent law, which further pointed to the
judge being the proper party to determine the construction of a patent. 82
72. Id. at 376.
73. Id. at 374–75.
74. Id. at 375.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 376.
77. Id. at 377–91.
78. Id. at 377 (if the “clear historical evidence that the very subsidiary question was so regarded
under the English practice of leaving the issue for a jury,” then the issue is required to go to the jury).
79. Id. at 384, 388–90.
80. Id. at 388.
81. Id. at 388–89.
82. Id. at 390. In its opinion, the Supreme Court indicated that public policy would be served by
uniformity in patent law. Id. By allowing parties to know the limitations of a patent, the patentee’s
inventive genius is protected. Id. Furthermore, uniformity avoids a zone of uncertainty, which would
discourage future patentees from experimenting for risk of patent infringement. Id. The Court also cites
to the fact that “Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate
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With its Markman decision, the Supreme Court “set a precedent for
the manner of determining whether an issue should be considered a
question of law or of fact, and thus whether the jury or the judge should
decide the issue.” 83 A court should consider whether a historical
analysis places the issue in the purview of a specific judicial actor, and if
it does not, the court should consider precedent, functional
considerations, and the need for uniformity. 84
The Markman factors are employed to determine if an issue within a
trial must be left to the jury in order to maintain the substance of the
right to a jury trial. With this in mind, the next two sections explore the
issues that must be decided in a public employee free speech trial. Part
III examines the Supreme Court’s public employee free speech
framework. Part IV examines the circuit split that has developed as to
whether the constitutionally protected status of a public employee’s
speech is decided by the judge or the jury. Using the Markman factors,
Part V argues that at least some of the issues raised in a public employee
free speech case must be decided by the jury to preserve the right to a
jury trial. Therefore, the protected status of speech must be labeled a
mixed question of law and fact.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH
FRAMEWORK
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.” 85 When the government acts as an
employer, the First Amendment’s prohibitions linger in the background;
these concerns are limited to government action and do not arise in the
private employment context. 86 Early in the twentieth century, public
employees did not have constitutionally protected rights to free speech
as “courts viewed public employment as a privilege that employees were

court for patent cases.” Id. See also H.R. R EP. N O . 97-312, at 20–23 (1981) (uniformity would
“strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and
industrial innovation”).
83. Biglin, supra note 2, at 161–62.
84. Id. at 152–57, 161–62.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that the party acted “under color of any statute . . . of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia.” See Parker, supra note 10, at 511 (American non-union
employment is typically at-will employment, which allows the employer to terminate the employment
relationship for any reason or no reason at all.); see also Gary W. Spring, A New Methodology for
Testing Permissible Communications in the Workplace, 2008 MICH. S T . L. R EV . 1023 (2008) for a
discussion of the National Labor Relations Act and an employee’s rights to freedom of speech in the
context of private union employment.
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theoretically free to accept or reject.” 87
Beginning in the 1950s, the Supreme Court shied away from the
principle that accepting public employment meant sacrificing
constitutional rights. In examining state mandated loyalty oaths, the
Court held that “constitutional protection does extend to the public
servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or
discriminatory,” which provided grounds for invalidating loyalty oath
statutes. 88 In 1967, the Court completely renounced the theory that
public employment could be conditioned on sacrificing constitutional
rights. 89 Although public employment cannot be conditioned on forcing
a public employee to sacrifice their constitutional rights, their rights are
not unfettered. Public employees’ constitutional rights are burdened by
the government’s interests as an employer, which differ from the
government’s interests in regulating the public’s speech. 90
The Supreme Court has attempted to flesh out the contours of a public
employee’s constitutional rights. Public employee free speech issues
arise almost exclusively within the context of employer retaliation
suits. 91 A retaliation suit recognizes that “as a general matter the First
Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an
[employee] to retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out.” 92 As the above
87. Parker, supra note 10, at 511 (“Until the 1950’s, the government could require employees to
check their first amendment freedoms at the workplace door.”). See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (Holmes, J.) (“The petitioner may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”).
88. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 185, 192 (1952).
89. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967) (“[T]he theory that public
employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how
unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.” (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239
(2d Cir. 1965))). A complete abrogation of all First Amendment rights as a means of accepting public
employment has been rejected; such complete abrogation would reduce the number of people willing to
undertake public employment. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565 (1968).
90. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. (“[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the
speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of
the speech of the citizenry in general.”).
91. A retaliation suit arises under the theory that “[o]fficial reprisal for protected speech ‘offends
the Constitution [because] it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right.’” Hartman v. Moore,
547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998)).
92. Id. See 1 RONNA G REFF S CHNEIDER , EDUCATION LAW : F IRST A MENDMENT , DUE
P ROCESS AND D ISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 2.20 (1st ed. Supp. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court
decisions make clear that the accommodation of the conflicting interests of the [public employee] as a
citizen and the [public employee] as an employee requires a three-part test. First it must be determined
whether the speech is constitutionally protected speech. Second, the employee must show that the
protected speech played a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment decision. Third,
even if the answer to the first two questions is yes, the employer may nevertheless avoid liability by
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that school authorities would have taken the same action
against the employee without considering the protected speech or considering only the disruptive nature
of speech.” (footnotes omitted)).
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language recognizes, a retaliation claim arises only for speech protected
by the First Amendment. The question in the public employment
context becomes what speech is protected. Through a triumvirate of
cases, the Supreme Court has sought to answer this question.
A. Pickering: Balancing the Rights of Public Employees and Their
Government Boss
In Pickering v. Board of Education, 93 the Supreme Court made its
first attempt at determining the extent to which the First Amendment
protects public employee speech. The Supreme Court held that
constitutional protection requires balancing the interests of a public
employee as a citizen against the interests of the state as an employer.94
If the employee’s right as a citizen to comment on a matter of public
concern outweighs the state’s interest as an employer to promote
efficiency, the employee’s speech should be constitutionally protected. 95
The case arose in the school context. Pickering was a teacher who
was dismissed after sending a letter to a local newspaper. 96 Pickering’s
letter was in response to the local newspaper publishing various letters
sent by the Teacher’s Organization and the superintendent promoting a
tax increase to support the local schools. 97 Pickering’s letter was sent
after the proposed tax increase failed at the polls. 98
In his
correspondence, Pickering criticized the school board’s handling of
previous bond proposals and the disparity in fund allocation between
athletics and academics. 99
Furthermore, the letter alleged the
superintendent prevented teachers from opposing the bond. 100
Following a full hearing by the school board, Pickering was dismissed
due to his letter’s detrimental effect on the efficient operation and
administration of the district’s schools; and, since the letter contained
false statements that “unjustifiably impugned the . . . ‘integrity . . . and
competence’” of school officials, that damaged professional reputations,
that “would be disruptive to faculty discipline,” and that fomented

93. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
94. Id. at 568.
95. Id. (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as
a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”).
96. Id. at 564.
97. Id. at 566.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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controversy. 101 The county circuit court and the Supreme Court of
Illinois affirmed Pickering’s dismissal. 102
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found Pickering’s comments
addressed matters of public concern including a difference of opinion
“as to the preferable manner of operating the school system” and “the
question of whether a school system requires additional funds.” 103 The
Court indicated that although Pickering’s comments were critical of
school authorities, such statements were not per se grounds for
dismissal. 104 The Court held that in order to provide grounds for
dismissal, statements must do more than simply anger higher ups; they
must interfere with the ability to perform duties or affect the school’s
ability to operate, such as destroying a superior’s authority to discipline,
preventing the school from raising funds, or negatively impacting
working relationships with fellow employees. 105
The Court found that none of these negative effects were present. 106
Therefore, the Court held that Pickering’s right to free speech trumped
the school’s alleged interest in maintaining order. 107 Furthermore, the
Court indicated that even if a public employee’s comments are false,
they cannot serve as grounds for dismissal unless they were knowingly
false or recklessly made. 108 By its own acknowledgement, the Pickering
Court refused to provide a general standard but instead established
“some of the general lines along which an analysis of the controlling
interests should run.” 109 Subsequent decisions have added gloss to these
general guidelines.
B. Connick: Increasing the Importance of Speech on Matters of Public
Concern
In Connick v. Myers, 110 the Supreme Court readdressed Pickering
and emphasized the employee’s interest in commenting on matters of
public concern. 111 Myers served as assistant district attorney, an at-will
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 564, 566–67.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id. at 570–73.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 569.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Id. at 143.
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position serving under District Attorney Connick. 112 Myers was
informed that she was going to be transferred to a different section of
criminal court; subsequently, she notified her supervisors that she
opposed this transfer. 113 Following another notice of the upcoming
transfer and a meeting with her superior Dennis Waldron, Myers
prepared a questionnaire regarding office policies. 114
Before
distributing the questionnaires, Myers was asked a third time about
transferring, and she indicated that she would consider a transfer.115
Shortly thereafter, Myers distributed the questionnaires to her coworkers. 116 Waldron found out about the questionnaires and contacted
Connick, who then met with and fired Myers for “her refusal to accept
the transfer.” 117
Myers filed suit for First Amendment retaliation. The district court
held a nonjury trial on the merits of the case. 118 The trial judge’s
findings of fact concluded that Myers was terminated due to the
questionnaire. 119 In his findings of law, the trial judge determined the
questionnaire was a matter of public concern because it “relate[d] to the
effective functioning of the District Attorney’s Office [which] are
matters of public importance and concern.” 120 When balancing the
employee’s and State’s interests, the trial judge concluded “it cannot be
said that the defendant’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the
public services performed through his employees was either adversely
affected or substantially impeded by plaintiff’s distribution of the
questionnaire.” 121 Thus, Myers prevailed.
112. Id. at 140.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 141. The questionnaire solicited “the views of her fellow staff members concerning
office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in
supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.” Id. The notion for
the questionnaire occurred after meeting “with Dennis Waldron, one of the first assistant district
attorneys.” Id. The meeting regarded Myers’ concerns about office matters. Id. Waldron indicated that
he did not believe the others in the office shared her concerns. Following this, Myers decided to do
some research. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The distribution of the questionnaires was also considered insubordination. Id.
118. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 753 (E.D. La. 1981), aff’d, 654 F.2d 719 (5th
Cir.1981), rev’d, 461 US. 138 (1983).
119. Id. at 755.
120. Id. at 758.
121. Id. at 759.
Appropriate factors to be taken into consideration in evaluating the State’s interest in
limiting its employees’ right to speak freely are: “(1) the need to maintain harmony
among co-workers; (2) the need for confidentiality; (3) the need to curtail conduct which
impedes the (employee’s) proper and competent performance of his daily duties; and (4)
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In reversing the district court’s decision, the Supreme Court reiterated
the need for public employees to maintain their rights to freedom of
speech regarding matters of public concern. 122 However, with the
exception of one question, 123 the Court held that Myers’ questionnaire
did not constitute speech on a matter of public concern because the
inquiries were “mere extensions of Myers’ dispute over her transfer to
another section of the criminal court.” 124 Since at least part of the
questionnaire related to a matter of public concern, the Court applied the
Pickering balancing test and found that Myers’ speech was
insubordinate and adversely affected working relationships. 125 One
question on the questionnaire concerned whether the employees had
confidence in their supervisors, which in and of itself had the potential
to undermine office relations. 126 This holding effectively made the
content of speech, whether it was on a matter of public concern a
threshold test, which must be met before courts advance to the Pickering
balancing test. 127
In examining whether speech is on a matter of public concern, the
Court indicated the analysis must be based on the speech’s content,

the need to encourage a close and personal relationship between the employee and his
superiors, where that relationship calls for loyalty and confidence.”
Id. at 758 (quoting Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972)).
122. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983). In analyzing Pickering, the Court indicated
that “the precedents in which Pickering is rooted, the invalidated statutes and actions sought to suppress
the rights of public employees to participate in public affairs.” Id. at 144–45 (citing Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)) (The Court emphasized the importance of public affairs and
public issues in the American form of government and self-governance.). The cases following Pickering
also attempted to safeguard speech on matters of public concern. Id. at 145 (citing generally Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Mt. Healthy City Bd. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Givhan v.
Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979)).
123. Id. at 146, 149. The Court held that the inquiry into whether public employees felt pressure
to work on political campaigns dealt with a matter of public concern. Id. at 149.
124. Id. at 146, 148–49. In contrast, the dissenting opinion in Connick believed the speech
addressed matters of public concern. The questionnaire addressed “‘the manner in which government is
operated or should be operated,’” which “is an essential part of the communications necessary for selfgovernance the protection of which was a central purpose of the First Amendment.” Id. at 156
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
125. Id. at 151 (majority opinion).
126. Id. at 152.
127. Id. at 146 (“Pickering, its antecedents and progeny, lead us to conclude that if Myers’
questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is
unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.”). See also SCHNEIDER, supra note 92,
§ 2.20; United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (The Pickering
balancing test applies if the employee’s speech was as a citizen on matters of public concern but the test
does not apply when the speech was on matters of personal interest.); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,
668 (1994) (“To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern . . . .”).
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form, and context. 128 The Court decided that if the speech is not related
“to any matter of political, social, or other concern of the community,”
then the speech is not a matter of public concern. 129 Thus, “government
officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment.” 130 The Court announced that this decision should be left
to the judge, indicating that “the inquiry into the protected status of
speech” is a question of law. 131
C. Garcetti: Using a Public Employee’s Job Duties to Ensure They Are
Speaking as a Citizen
By the time the Court heard Garcetti v. Ceballos, 132 the inquiry into
whether a public employee’s speech was constitutionally protected was
a two-part analysis 133 performed by the judge. 134 In Garcetti, the Court
took the opportunity to elaborate on what it means to speak as a
citizen. 135
Ceballos was a deputy district attorney exercising
supervisory responsibilities over other attorneys in the District
Attorney’s Office. 136 A defense attorney contacted Ceballos regarding
inaccurate information contained in an affidavit used to obtain a search
128. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48.
129. Id. at 146.
130. Id. Private matters do not completely fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.
The Court held “only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.” Id. at 147. While
it is advisable for public officials to be receptive “to constructive criticism offered by their employees,
the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints
over internal office affairs.” Id. at 149.
131. Id. at 148 n.7.
132. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
133. Id. at 418 (“Pickering and the cases decided in its wake identify two inquiries to guide
interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to public employee speech. The first requires
determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If the answer is no,
the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the
speech. If the answer is yes, then the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises. The question
becomes whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee
differently from any other member of the general public.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
134. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7. But see Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1342 (8th
Cir. 1993) (although recognizing that the inquiry into the constitutionally protected status of speech is a
question of law for the court, the Eighth Circuit recognized that “[a]ny underlying factual disputes
concerning whether the plaintiff’s speech is protected, however, should be submitted to the jury”). See
also Parker, supra note 10, at 525–57, for a discussion of Connick and a proposal that policy reasons
indicate that the protected status of public employee speech should be left to the jury.
135. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419–22.
136. Id. at 413.
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warrant. 137 After efforts to comprehend the discrepancies, Ceballos
drafted a memo on the issue. 138 A heated meeting was held regarding
the warrant and the affidavit. 139
Despite Ceballos’ efforts, the
prosecution proceeded. 140 During trial, the defense called Ceballos as a
witness to discuss his observations regarding the affidavit. 141
Following the trial, Ceballos alleged he suffered adverse employment
actions. 142 After administrative avenues failed, Ceballos filed suit.143
The district court found Ceballos’ speech was not protected and granted
summary judgment for the employer. 144 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
concluding that the memo’s content regarded official misconduct, which
is a matter of public concern. 145
In its analysis, the Supreme Court recognized the two-prong test
established by Pickering and its progeny: “whether the employee spoke
as a citizen on a matter of public concern,” and “whether the relevant
government entity has an adequate justification for treating the
employee differently from any other member of the general public.” 146
The Court then elaborated on what it means to speak as a citizen,
holding “that when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.” 147 Unfortunately, the Court
137. Id. at 413–14. After conducting an investigation, Ceballos concluded the affidavit contained
misrepresentations. Id. Following his investigation, Ceballos discussed the discrepancies with a deputy
sheriff. Id. Unsatisfied with the explanation, Ceballos contacted his supervisors and wrote a
memorandum. Id.
138. Id. at 414. The memo was submitted to his supervisor. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 414–15.
142. Id. at 415. The alleged adverse employment “actions included reassignment from his
calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a
promotion.” Id.
143. Id. Ceballos filed an employment grievance, which was denied. Id. Following denial of his
employment grievance, suit was filed in federal court alleging retaliation for the memo, which violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
144. Id. The memo was written pursuant to employment duties and therefore, was not protected
by the First Amendment. Id. Additionally, qualified immunity provided alternative grounds for
granting summary judgment. Id.
145. Id. at 415–16.
146. Id. at 418. In order for the court to have to address the second inquiry, the answer to the first
question must be affirmative. If the speech was not spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern,
then “the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to
the speech.” See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
147. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419–22. “[A] citizen who works for the government is nonetheless a
citizen.” Id. at 411. Precedent has recognized the interests served by allowing employees to speak, but
have sought to balance the individual and societal interests with allowing government employees to
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failed to provide a comprehensive framework for determining whether
speech is pursuant to an employee’s official duties. 148 However, the
Court did indicate that the determination should be made after a
practical inquiry. 149 The Court did not elaborate on whether the judge or
the jury is to make this practical inquiry.
In summation, the Supreme Court has established a three-prong test to
determine whether a public employee’s speech is constitutionally
protected. 150 First, the speech must be made as a citizen, which means
the speech cannot be made pursuant to official employment duties.151
Second, the speech must be on a matter of public concern. 152 Third, the
Court must determine whether the government as an employer has
grounds for treating the employee differently than the general public. 153
IV. DEVELOPING A CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ INABILITY TO
CONSISTENTLY ALLOCATE THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE’S SPEECH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
In Connick, the Supreme Court exercised its power to classify issues
within a trial as either questions of law or questions of fact. 154 The
Connick Court indicated that the “inquiry into the protected status of
speech is one of law, not fact.” 155 Courts have questioned whether

speak and the governmental and societal interests in efficient performance of public functions. Id. A
key distinction is that the First Amendment does not provide a means of constitutionalizing an
employee’s grievance.
148. Id. at 424.
149. Id. at 424–25. By indicating that the inquiry is a practical one, the Supreme Court was
attempting to prevent government employers from incorporating overbroad formal job descriptions in an
attempt to expand the scope of professional duties and overly-restricting their employees’ First
Amendment rights.
150. Whether a public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected is only one aspect of a First
Amendment retaliation suit. If the speech is protected, the employee must show that the protected
speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action taken against them,
meaning there must be a causal connection. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977). The government can escape liability for an alleged constitutional violation if they
provide evidence that the adverse employment would have occurred regardless of the protected speech.
Id. Since these other factors are outside of the purpose of this Comment, they are not addressed
completely. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 92, § 2.20, for a complete discussion of the development of the
public employee speech analytical framework.
151. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. Since Ceballos’ statements were “made pursuant to his duties as a
calendar deputy,” his speech was not constitutionally protected and the inquiry ended. Id. The Court
did not go on to discuss whether his speech was on a matter of public concern and did not employ the
Pickering balancing test, which indicates the threshold nature of this prong.
152. Id. at 418.
153. Id.
154. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
155. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983).
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Connick’s classification remains undisturbed after Garcetti. Circuit
courts have split in their attempts to ascertain if Garcetti’s test for
determining whether speech occurs within the scope of employment
alters Connick’s classification. The Ninth Circuit recently joined this
debate in Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille School District No. 84. 156 The
following Part provides an overview of Posey and an analysis of the
split. This Part concludes by discussing the Ninth Circuit’s holding that
the protected status of a public employee’s speech is a mixed question of
law and fact.
A. The Circuit Split
In Posey, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the inquiry into the
protected status of speech is a question of law or fact. The court stated it
was clear that prior to Garcetti the “two-stage inquiry into the protected
status of the speech was purely legal.” 157 However, the court noted that
Garcetti added a third prong to the test, “requiring a determination [as
to] whether the plaintiff spoke as a public employee or instead [as] a
private citizen;” this addition calls into question the previous holding
that the protected status of speech is a question of law. 158 The court
noted that “[o]ur sister circuits are split over the resolution of this
question.” 159 While Posey provides a brief analysis of the circuit split,
the following provides a more comprehensive discussion first addressing
the circuits that have held the issue to be a question of law, followed by
the circuits that have held the issue to be a mixed question of law and
fact.
1. The Inquiry is a Question of Law
When a court classifies an issue as a question of law, it does so
“ordinarily without fanfare or explanation other than the ambiguous

156. 546 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2008) (the question before the court is whether in light of
Garcetti “the inquiry into the protected status of speech in a First Amendment retaliation claim remains
a question of law properly decided at summary judgment or instead now presents a mixed question of
fact and law.”).
157. Id. at 1126.
158. Id. at 1126–27. “Given the factual disputes presented in the record, we must therefore
determine whether the inquiry into the protected status of speech remains one purely of law as stated in
Connick, or if instead Garcetti has transformed it into a mixed question of fact and law.” Id. at 1127.
The need for this determination largely arises out of the Court’s inability in Garcetti to provide a
comprehensive framework to determine what constitutes the scope of an employee’s duties.
159. Id. at 1127–28.
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statement that the question presented is one of law.” 160 In Connick, the
Supreme Court provided no reason for their decision to label the
protected status of speech a question of law. 161 In a similar vein, circuit
courts typically provide no reason to support their view that the inquiry
into the protected status of speech remains a question of law.
For instance, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that
whether a public employee “engaged in protected speech is a purely
legal question over which we have appellate jurisdiction.” 162 In Charles
v. Grief, Charles, an African American employee of the Texas Lottery
Commission, e-mailed high-ranking Commission officials regarding
racial discrimination and retaliation towards minority employees,
including himself. 163 Charles later sent the same e-mail to members of
the state legislature. 164 Following a meeting with human resources,
Charles was fired. 165
On appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
Charles, the Fifth Circuit identified the inquiry into the protected status
of speech as a purely legal question. 166 In making this determination,
the court cited to Williams v. Dallas Independent School District, 167
identifying its previous proposition that in determining whether a public
employee’s speech is constitutionally protected, Garcetti merely shifted
the “focus from the content of the speech to the role the speaker
occupied when he said it.” 168 Based on this mere shift, the Fifth Circuit
relied on Connick for the proposition that the inquiry into the protected
status of speech is a question of law. 169 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit and
the District of Columbia Circuit have also extended Connick’s
proposition that whether a public employee’s speech is constitutionally
protected is a question of law. 170

160. Louis, supra note 57, at 1018.
161. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983) (“The inquiry into the protected status of
speech is one of law, not fact.”).
162. Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2008).
163. Id. at 509–10.
164. Id. at 510.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 510, 512.
167. 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007).
168. Id. at 692.
169. Charles, 522 F.3d at 512.
170. See Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007). After
Garcetti, the Tenth Circuit holds the analysis for a public employee’s free speech retaliation claim
requires five steps: whether the employee spoke pursuant to his official duties, whether the speech was
on a matter of public concern, whether the employee’s interests outweigh the state’s interests as an
employer, the speech must be a substantial or motivating factor in the detrimental employment action,
and there must not be other grounds that indicate the employer would have took similar actions. Id. at
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2. The Inquiry is a Mixed Question of Law and Fact
In contrast to the Fifth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits, the
Third and Eighth Circuits have, to some extent, questioned the view that
the constitutionally protected status of speech is a question of law. 171 In
a pre-Garcetti case, the Eighth Circuit, while recognizing that the
inquiry into the protected status of speech is a question of law for the
court, 172 indicated that “[a]ny underlying factual disputes concerning
whether the plaintiff’s speech is protected, however, should be
submitted to the jury.” 173 The court indicated that it is responsible for
combining the jury’s factual findings with the court’s legal conclusions
to determine whether the plaintiff’s speech is protected. 174
Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Third Circuit has expressly held the
inquiry into the protected status of speech to be a mixed question of law
and fact. 175 In Foraker v. Chaffinch, 176 the Third Circuit held that
“[u]nlike the question of whether speech is protected by the First
Amendment, the question of whether a particular incident of speech is
made within a particular plaintiff’s job duties is a mixed question of fact

1202–03. “The first three steps are to be resolved by the district court, while the last two are ordinarily
for the trier of fact.” Id. at 1203 (citing Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir.
1998)); see also Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2007). After Garcetti, the Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia still maintains the four prong analysis for a public employee free speech
retaliation claim with the first two prongs being that “the public employee must have spoken as a citizen
on a matter of public concern” and whether the employee’s interests outweigh the government’s interest.
The court indicates that these first two factors are questions of law for the court to resolve. Id. at 1149
(citing Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
171. In Posey, the court indicates that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has implicitly sided with the Third
Circuit [holding that the constitutionally protected status of speech is a mixed question of law and fact],
concluding in Davis v. Cook County, that summary judgment was appropriate because ‘no rational trier
of fact could find’ that Davis’s speech had been made in her capacity as a private citizen.” Posey v.
Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Davis v. Cook
County, 534 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2008)). However, a more in depth glance at Davis indicates that the
court states “[f]urther, ‘[t]he inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact.’” Davis,
534 F.3d at 653 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983)). The court goes on to say
“[r]aising a First Amendment claim, without more, does not guarantee that a jury is necessary.” Id.; see
also Bryant v. Gardner, 587 F. Supp.2d 951, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (the district court cites Davis for the
proposition that the protected status of speech is a question of law).
172. McGee v. Public Water Supply, Dist. No. 2 of Jefferson County, Mo., 471 F.3d 918, 920 (8th
Cir. 2006). “To decide whether a public employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment, a
court must first determine” if the speech was spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Id.
“This is a question of law for the court.” Id. (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7).
173. Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1993).
174. Id. at 1342–43.
175. Reilly v. Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 227 (3d Cir. 2008) (“‘whether a particular incident of
speech is made within a particular plaintiff’s job duties is a mixed question of fact and law’”) (quoting
Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2007)).
176. 501 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2007).
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and law.” 177 The court held that determining whether a public
employee’s speech was made pursuant to their official duties is such a
fact intensive inquiry that it is properly held as a mixed question of law
and fact. 178 Another aspect in their holding was that as a practical
matter the trial court was in a better position to determine the extent of
the employee’s official duties, 179 largely because of the trial court’s
experience in presiding over this type of litigation. 180 Believing the trial
court to be in a better position to make the determination, the appellate
court deferred to their factual finding, which indicates the inquiry is a
question of fact. 181
B. The Facts of Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84
Robert Posey was a former high school employee who served as a
security specialist. 182 Posey developed concerns about the school’s
safety and emergency policies and communicated those concerns to the
high school’s principal. 183 When the principal failed to respond, Posey
wrote a letter to his friend Steve Battenschlag, who was the school
district’s Chief Administrative Officer. 184 The letter addressed Posey’s
personal grievances and his concerns about the district’s inadequate
security policies. 185 Following the letter, Battenschlag and the school
district’s superintendent met with Posey at his home. 186 Subsequently,
the principal severely reduced Posey’s responsibilities. 187 At the end of
177. Id. at 240.
178. Id. But see Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (whether speech is
protected is a question of law).
179. Foraker, 501 F.3d at 240–41.
180. Id. (citing Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006)).
181. Id.
182. Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2008).
183. Id. at 1124.
184. Id. (“The letter was copied to the Superintendent Mark Berryhill,” and two other
administrators.).
185. Id. The letter contained both personal grievances and concerns about inadequate safety. Id.
The personal grievance dealt with how the principal treated and dealt with Posey. Id. The letter
specifically addressed Posey’s concerns about inadequate safety including: “(1) the administration’s
general unresponsiveness to safety problems, (2) inadequate staff and faculty training, (3) concealment
and insufficient documentation of safety violations, (4) ineffective enforcement of truancy policies, (5)
ineffective enforcement of sexual harassment policies, and (6) inadequate fire safety and school
evacuation planning.” Id. Posey supported each concern with a specific example. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1125. The principal reduced Posey’s job responsibilities including relieving Posey’s
“responsibility for all specified tasks except assisting with security and crime prevention, and
supervising the school parking lot, grounds, and hallways.” Id. In addition, Posey “was no longer
responsible for liaising with police, enforcing truancy policies, searching students, and investigating
student misconduct.” Id.
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the following school year, Posey’s responsibilities were consolidated
with those of three other employees, and Posey was fired. 188
Posey filed a grievance. 189 When administrative efforts failed, Posey
filed suit in state court alleging various state claims as well as a § 1983
claim asserting he was retaliated against for his letter and subsequent
meeting with school officials. 190 The school district removed the case to
federal court. 191 After discovery, the defendant moved for summary
judgment claiming Posey’s speech was made pursuant to his
employment duties precluding First Amendment protection. 192 The
district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and
Posey appealed. 193
C. The Ninth Circuit Holds the Analysis as to the Protected Status of a
Public Employee’s Speech is a Mixed Question of Law and Fact
After addressing the circuit split addressed above, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that “the determination [as to] whether the speech in question
was spoken as a public employee or a private citizen presents a mixed
question of fact and law.” 194 In making this determination, the Ninth
Circuit focused on the Supreme Court’s precedent distinguishing
questions of law from questions of fact instead of relying on the Court’s
conclusory indication in Connick. The Supreme Court has held that
“facts that can be ‘found’ by ‘application of . . . ordinary principles of
logic and common experience . . . are ordinarily entrusted to the finder
of fact.’” 195 Since Garcetti indicated that the scope of an employee’s
official duties is a practical, not a mechanical, inquiry, “the scope and
content of a plaintiff’s job responsibilities can and should be found by a
trier of fact” by applying principles of logic and common experience. 196
After indicating that determining the extent of a plaintiff’s job duties
was a question of fact for the jury, the court considered potential reasons
for removing the issue from the jury. The court held that allowing the
jury to make a factual determination as to a plaintiff’s job
188. Id.
189. Id. Following the initial grievance, the school board determined Posey was the subject of
retaliation for his letter. Id. However, the governing board of the district voided this conclusion. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1125–26.
193. Id. at 1126.
194. Id. at 1127–29.
195. Id. at 1129 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
501 n.17 (1984)).
196. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/9

24

Patrick: PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEE
PATRICK FINAL FORMAT 2

2010]

2/11/2011 4:14:42 PM

PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

399

responsibilities does “not encroach upon the court’s prerogative to
interpret and apply the relevant legal rules.” 197 Additionally, while the
possibility exists that the jury’s factual conclusion could be dispositive
of a constitutional question, this is not grounds for removing the issue
from the jury. 198 Even if an issue is a factual determination, the court is
still obligated to evaluate the significance of the facts found. 199
Regarding the disposition of the case, the court concluded a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to Posey’s job responsibilities, which
precluded summary judgment as to whether Posey spoke as a citizen. 200
However, the court recognized that alternative grounds for summary
judgment could exist in dealing with whether an employee’s speech is
constitutionally protected. 201 These alternative grounds included the
speech not being on a matter of public concern or the presence of
adequate government justification for treating the employee differently
than a member of the general public. 202 With neither of the alternative
grounds present in Posey’s case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further
proceedings. 203
The Ninth Circuit held that “the inquiry into the protected status of
speech presents a mixed question of fact and law,” specifically holding
that the scope of a plaintiff’s job responsibilities is a question of fact. 204
The Ninth Circuit has subsequently affirmed its holding in Posey. 205 In
Posey, the court also set out a general process for addressing whether a
public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected. The inquiry
begins by first answering the two legal questions: whether the speech
was on a matter of public concern and whether the state lacked grounds
to treat the employee differently than the general public. 206 If and only
if the court answers these two questions in the affirmative does the issue

197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985)).
199. Id. at 1129 (citing Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 500–01). “Indeed, although a fact-finder’s
determination as to a plaintiff’s job responsibilities may at times appear in itself dispositive of the
protected status inquiry, the ‘rule of independent review’ will always require the court independently to
evaluate the ultimate constitutional significance of the facts as found.” Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1129–30.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1130–31.
204. Id. at 1130.
205. See Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009) (determining a plaintiff’s job
responsibilities is a question of fact); Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[t]he scope
of [plaintiff’s] job duties is a question of fact.”).
206. Posey, 546 F.3d at 1130–31.
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of whether the public employee spoke as a citizen become relevant. 207
If there is a genuine issue “as to the scope and content of the plaintiff’s
job responsibilities,” the jury must decide the extent of an employee’s
job duties before the court can determine in what role the employee
spoke. 208
V. TO PRESERVE THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT, DETERMINING THE
CONSTITUIONALLY PROTECTED STATUS OF A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE’S FREE
SPEECH MUST PARTIALLY FALL TO THE JURY AND BE LABELED A MIXED
QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT
In a trial regarding public employee free speech, the right to a jury
trial will almost always be present. A suit alleging First Amendment
retaliation will be brought under § 1983. 209 In a § 1983 action, the
parties will have a right to a jury trial if the relief sought is legal in
nature. 210 A First Amendment retaliation suit requires an adverse
employment action be taken against the employee, 211 which likely will
result in the plaintiff seeking compensatory damages for lost wages. 212
Compensatory damages are traditionally legal relief, virtually ensuring
the parties a right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. 213
Since the right to a jury trial seems to exist in a § 1983 suit for First
Amendment retaliation, the remainder of this Part focuses on whether
the constitutionally protected status of a public employee’s free speech,
specifically when determining the scope of a plaintiff’s official duties, is
an issue that must be decided by the jury to preserve the substance of the
right to a jury trial. This analysis will take place using three of the four
Markman factors: (1) historical analogy; (2) functional considerations;
and (3) the importance of uniformity. 214 The fourth Markman factor,
precedent, will not be considered since, as indicated by the circuit split,
precedent is inconclusive. 215
One scholar argued that policy
considerations should be used exclusively in determining the proper
207. Id. at 1131.
208. Id. Judgment is reserved until after the fact-finding process so that the jury may determine
the plaintiff’s job responsibilities. Id.
209. See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 150. Examples of adverse employment actions include termination of
employment or demotion.
212. See D AN B. D OBBS & P AUL T. HAYDEN , TO RTS AND C OMPENSATION : P ERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND S OCIAL R ESPONSIBILITY FOR I NJURY 855–57 (5th ed. 2005).
213. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 157–181 and accompanying text.
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judicial actor. 216 Although not used exclusively, policy considerations
are integrated into the Markman analysis. The results of the Markman
analysis can be used to label the inquiry as one of law or fact. 217
A. Historical Analogy
Historically, American juries have been viewed as protectors of
liberty. 218 In Federalist No. 83, Alexander Hamilton indicated that the
only difference between the supporters of the Constitution and its
opponents when it came to the role of juries was that “the former regard
it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very
palladium of free government.” 219 The first Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, John Jay, in the first jury case before the Supreme
Court, informed the jurors that they had the right to determine the law
and the facts of the case. 220 While the historical importance of the jury
is not doubted, Markman’s historical analogy requires an analysis as to
whether the constitutionally protected status of speech was historically
left to the jury at common law. 221
At common law, there was no First Amendment. The closest analogy
at common law is a seditious libel claim. 222 Within seditious libel
jurisprudence, debate existed regarding the proper role of the judge and
the jury. 223 Two competing viewpoints existed, each of which affected
216. Parker, supra note 10, at 488–501 (“Part I of this article evaluates the traditional way in
which courts label issues either questions of fact or questions of law. The mechanical adhesion to the
Coke maxim [see supra note 10] is not, however, suited to the complex issues involved in free
expression cases. A better approach is to adopt a policy-based determination of what issues should be
given to the jury and what issues reserved for the court.”).
217. The question of law/fact dichotomy can arise without a jury trial, see supra note 67, but when
the right to a jury trial exists and an issue must fall to the jury to preserve the jury trial right, that
conclusion would provide evidence that the inquiry should be a question of fact.
218. Parker, supra note 10, at 496.
219. THE F EDERALIST NO . 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
220. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794) (“It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind
you of the good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law, it is
the province of the court to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this
reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of
both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On this, and on every other occasion,
however, we have no doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the court: For, as
on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand,
presumable, that the court are the best judges of law. But still both objects are lawfully, within your
power of decision.”).
221. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 377 (1996) (if the “clear historical
evidence that the very subsidiary question was so regarded under the English practice of leaving the
issue for a jury,” then the issue is required to go to the jury).
222. Parker, supra note 10, at 502.
223. Id.
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the perceived role of the jury. One view was autocratic, holding that the
rulers were superior to their people and that the jury’s only role within a
seditious libel suit was “determining whether [the] publication in fact
occurred and whether it referred to a member of the ruling class.” 224 In
the contrasting view, the rulers were servants of the people, a theory
which gave juries the primary decision-making role in a libel suit. 225
The trial of Peter Zenger demonstrates that the debate between the
conflicting viewpoints was resolved in favor of the latter. Peter Zenger,
the publisher of the New York Weekly Journal, was prosecuted for
protesting the Royal Governor’s removal of the colony’s chief justice. 226
Zenger’s attorney argued the jury had “the right, beyond all dispute, to
determine both the law and the fact; and where they do not doubt of the
law, they ought to do so.” 227 The colonial court concluded that the issue
of libel was for the jury. 228 As one scholar has noted, “[t]he Peter
Zenger case firmly established that juries in the American colonies had
the right to decide the libel issue.” 229 The scholar went on to say “[t]he
historical record strongly suggests that the Founders would insist that
citizen jurors have input in resolving mixed issues of law and fact under
the [F]irst [A]mendment.” 230 Based on historical analogy to seditious
libel cases at common law, it appears that juries should have a role in
resolving the constitutionally protected status of speech.
B. Functional Considerations
“[T]he decision to label an issue a ‘question of law,’ a ‘question of
fact,’ or a ‘mixed question of law and fact’ is sometimes as much a
matter of allocation as it is of analysis.” 231 When the court allocates an
issue, it traditionally focuses on the sound administration of justice. 232
In considering the sound administration of justice, the various
experiences of each judicial actor must be considered to determine
which actor is in the best position to address the issue. 233 The best
position inquiry must consider two levels of actors. First, which actor,
224. Id.
225. Id. at 503.
226. See Trial of John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell’s St. Tr. 675 (1735), quoted in IRVING BRANT,
THE B ILL OF R IGHTS: I TS ORIGIN AND MEANING 175 (1965).
227. Id. at 178.
228. Id. at 179.
229. Parker, supra note 10, at 503.
230. Id.
231. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112–14 (1985).
232. Id. at 114.
233. Id.
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the judge or the jury, within the trial court is in the best position; second,
is the trial court or the appellate court in a better position to make the
determination?
At the trial court level, the jury is in a better position to determine the
scope of an employee’s duties. The Garcetti Court indicated that the
inquiry into whether a public employee’s speech is made pursuant to the
employee’s official duties must be a practical inquiry requiring more
than simply looking at a formal job description. 234 With the practical
nature of the inquiry in mind, the jury is likely more competent to make
the determination than the judge. The Court has also held that a § 1983
suit sounds in tort law. 235 Similarity to tort law allows for comparison
to a tort suit holding an employer liable for their employees’ actions
under a theory of respondeat superior.
To hold an employer liable under a theory of respondeat superior, the
jury must determine “whether [the] employee was acting within the
course and scope of his job.” 236 In making this determination, the judge
usually applies the set of facts, whether undisputed or found by the jury,
to the legal standard. 237 The theory behind allowing the jury to decide
this type of question is that jury members have a variety of real world
experiences that judges often lack. 238 Additionally, a group of people
tend to “know more of the common affairs of life than does one man
[and] . . . can draw wiser and safer conclusions from . . . facts . . . than
can a single judge.” 239 When it comes to making “subjective judgments
based on peoples’ experiences and perceptions of the world,” such as
determining the scope of an employee’s official duties, these judgments
are “best made by a group, rather than by a single individual.” 240 Jurors
are in a better position to make practical determinations than are trial
judges.
The best position inquiry needs to take into account whether the trial
or appellate court is in a better position. This inquiry is necessary due to
the differences in appellate review regarding a question of law and one
of fact. A factual finding is given deference and will only be overturned
if it is clearly erroneous. 241 Labeling an issue as a question of fact
significantly raises “the height of the hurdles over which an appellant

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424–25 (2006).
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999).
Warner, supra note 3, at 111.
Id.
Reytblat, supra note 4, at 196.
Sioux City &. Pac. R.R.Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 663–64 (1873).
Reytblat, supra note 4, at 197.
Hofer, supra note 2, at 233.
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must leap in order to prevail on appeal.” 242 An inherent difference
exists between trial and appellate courts, which is a partial source for the
level of deference given to factual findings. Trial courts have the benefit
of live testimony while appellate courts are bound to the cold record. 243
Live testimony provides the opportunity “to view the demeanor of
witnesses and assess their credibility.” 244 To analyze whether the
appellate court should defer to the findings of a trial court, scholars have
developed a functional analysis looking at whether the trial court’s
determination was based upon:
(1) An assessment of the credibility of any witnesses? (2) A weighing of
conflicting testimony? (3) A weighing of conflicting evidence? and (4)
The application of a statute within the particular expertise of that
tribunal? Negative answers to all these questions suggest that the issue is
one to which little deference should be paid — conventionally, an issue of
law. Affirmative answers to any of these questions suggest that the issue
is one to which some deference should be paid — conventionally, one of
fact. 245

Using this functional analysis, it appears that the trial court is in a
better position to determine the scope of a public employee’s duties. As
stated in Garcetti, the scope of an employee’s duties is not based on a
written job description. Instead, it is a practical inquiry. Questions must
be answered such as: What tasks did you perform on a daily basis? How
often did you perform a particular task? What was your understanding
of your job? These are all questions answered while the employee is
testifying. The employer will also have to answer similar questions
creating the potential for conflicting testimony. With this in mind, there
would be affirmative answers to at least the first three functional
analysis questions. The importance of the live record indicates that the
appellate court must pay deference to the trial court’s determination 246
indicating that the issue is likely one of fact.
Court efficiency also plays a role in allocating authority to the trial
court over the appellate court. In modern America, a litigation
explosion burdens the court system. 247 The appellate courts, through
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 232.
Id.
Id. at 238 (quoting State v. Pepin, 328 N.W.2d 898, 900 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982)).
Id. at 242.
See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. R EV . 635, 664 (1971) (one reason for an appellate court deferring to the trial court is the
superiority of the trial court’s position in being present at the time; conferring to the trial court is
especially important when a decision is “based on facts or circumstances that are critical to decision and
that the record imperfectly conveys”).
247. Louis, supra note 57, at 1013.
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their crowded dockets and busy time schedules, receive the brunt of the
adverse affects of this explosion, which has resulted in a “modern shift
in power towards the trial level.” 248 When it comes to mixed questions,
it makes sense to allocate them to the discretion of the trial court and
limit the standard of appellate review. If the standard of review is not
limited and appellate courts more frequently review the issues de novo,
the “appellate courts would have to steal the necessary additional time
from the law-declaring function, which has already received short shrift
in this era of crowded dockets.” 249 In addition, increased de novo
review would further burden the appellate courts’ time due to a likely
increase in frivolous appeals. In many issues involving mixed questions,
appellate courts also do not have any “special competence . . . and would
not necessarily decide them [any] better than would trial level fact
finders.” 250 As a matter of efficiency, policy considerations favor trial
level decision-making with a limited standard of appellate review,251
which are hallmarks of a question of fact.
Court efficiency also provides further functional considerations
outside of comparing the positions of trial and appellate courts. A
potential fear of turning the constitutionally protected status of speech
into a mixed question of law and fact is that it will diminish the court’s
ability to grant summary judgment. However, even if one inquiry is
reserved for the jury, the court still maintains its judicial screening
role. 252 The judicial screening role “entails regulating the actions of the
parties to ensure that the adjudicative process unfolds in a way that
comports with systemic norms.” 253 When exercising its screening role,
the court determines the appropriateness of the forum, establishes “what
data may be relied upon in deciding any question, as well as whether a
proposed question is appropriate,” and concludes “whether reasonable
minds could differ on a question posed.” 254
By determining if reasonable minds could differ, the court exercises
procedural control over the proceedings. 255 Procedural control is

248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1013–14.
251. Reytblat, supra note 4, at 211. By allocating an issue as a question of fact entitled to
appellate court deference, the appellate court avoids duplicating the efforts of the trial court saving delay
and time.
252. Kirgis, supra 14, at 1146 (“In the screening role, the judge makes many decisions involving
the ‘facts’ of the case. Nevertheless, these decisions are not understood to implicate the Seventh
Amendment.”).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1152.
255. Reytblat, supra note 4, at 212.
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maintained regardless of whether an issue is a question of law or fact. 256
Through their procedural control, a judge can still grant a motion for
summary judgment if the evidence does not create a genuine issue of
material fact. 257 A judge can grant motions for judgment as a matter of
law when a reasonable trier of fact could only reach one conclusion.258
Both summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law would be
permissible when speech is so clearly within the scope of an employee’s
duties.
Even if there is a question as to the scope of an employee’s duties, the
inquiry into the constitutionally protected status of speech could be
tailored to consider this question last. 259 In other words, by first
addressing whether the employee spoke on a matter of public concern
and whether the public employee’s rights are greater than the
government’s rights as an employer, the court can often determine the
issue without reaching the factual questions. Motions for summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law can still be granted based on
the other prongs of the inquiry. This procedural control allows the court
to eliminate frivolous claims while providing meritorious claims with a
more in-depth analysis.
C. The Importance of Uniformity
Within the context of public employee free speech, the quest for
uniformity is illusory. 260 For the Supreme Court, uniformity does not
appear to be a concern. In Pickering, the Court indicated that they were
merely providing some general guidelines, not a comprehensive
standard. 261 The Garcetti Court also failed to provide a standard. 262 In
addition, the Court also held that job descriptions do not determine the

256. Id.
257. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
258. FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
259. See supra notes 206–208 and accompanying text.
260. Parker, supra note 10, at 543 (“The Court’s quest for uniformity, however, is largely illusory.
Notably absent from Connick and its progeny is any guidance for judges facing future first amendment
claims. What quantum of ‘inefficiency’ will be tolerated before the disruption caused by an employee’s
speech will destroy the right to speak? How many recipients are necessary to make a credit report a
matter of public concern? Clearly Connick will allow judges who are most sympathetic to employees to
rule in favor of first amendment claims and will also allow judges who pay greater deference to ‘at will’
employment interests in government agencies to hold first amendment claims to be frivolous. Whatever
the philosophical bent of judges faced with future free speech claims, each judge may, in effect, be
applying his or her individual ‘community mores’ standard to determine how much ‘free’ speech will be
tolerated.”).
261. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968).
262. See supra note 148–149 and accompanying text.
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scope of an employee’s duties, virtually eliminating any uniform method
of determining such duties. Any hope of salvaging a uniform means of
deciding the scope of an employee’s duties was destroyed when the
Court indicated that it was a practical inquiry.
“Unlike the declaration of a judge, a jury verdict carries no
precedential value. . . .” 263 Some areas of the law require uniformity and
certainty, 264 which can trump any consideration in favor of a jury.
When considering the importance of uniformity, two factors should be
measured: “(1) the likelihood of recurrence of the fact pattern to which
the law is being applied in a specific case; and[,] (2) regardless of the
probability of repetition of a fact pattern, whether an example of law
application by a judge can realistically be expected to have an influence
on prospective human behavior.” 265
Neither of these factors indicates a need for uniformity. The practical
nature of the inquiry of an employee’s job duties precludes these factors.
A practical inquiry takes into account the individual variances of each
employment situation. Meaning for each employee different facts will
need to be considered to determine the scope of their official duties. The
level of specificity required for a practical inquiry precludes the
recurrence of fact patterns. Furthermore, the practical inquiry will vary
depending on the time, context, and content of the speech. In such a fact
intensive inquiry where potentially every factor can vary from case to
case, it is impossible to structure a framework that would influence
employer or employee behavior in any significant way. The structure of
the public employee free speech analytical framework virtually
precludes any possibility for uniformity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Markman factors demonstrate that a portion of the inquiry into
the constitutionally protected status of speech, specifically the scope of a
public employee’s job duties, must fall to the jury to maintain the
substance of the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial. By
mandating that part of the inquiry falls to the jury, the issue is properly
labeled a mixed question of law and fact. The practical nature of the
inquiry into an employee’s job duties, which will likely require witness
testimony and demeanor evidence, also indicates that the jury is the
proper party to decide the issue. The need for court efficiency provides
263. Parker, supra note 10, at 501.
264. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
265. Parker, supra note 10, at 501 (citing Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the LawFact Distinction, 54 C AL . L. R EV . 1867, 1926–27 (1966)).
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support for labeling the issue a question of fact. Appellate courts review
findings of fact with deference, which save judicial resources by
avoiding repetitive analysis.
By mandating that the scope of an employee’s duties is to be decided
by the jury, the inquiry into the constitutionally protected status of
speech becomes, as indicated by the Third and Ninth Circuits, a mixed
question of law and fact. As a means of maintaining efficiency, the
Ninth Circuit provided an adequate procedure for addressing the
protected status of a public employee’s speech. First, the court should
address the legal questions: determining if the speech was on a matter of
public concern and if the government had grounds for treating the
employee differently than the general public. 266 If the case cannot be
resolved based on legal questions, the court then addresses whether the
public employee spoke as a citizen. 267 If there is a genuine issue “as to
the scope and content of the plaintiff’s job responsibilities,” the jury
must decide the extent of an employee’s job duties before the court can
determine in what role the employee spoke. 268

266. Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2008).
267. Id. at 1131.
268. Id. (Judgment is reserved until after the fact-finding process so that the jury may determine
the plaintiff’s job responsibilities).
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